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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989) and 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) 
(Supp. 1990). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the Utah Tax Commission properly determine the fair market 
value of Questar's operating property for 1988 in light of the 
stipulated facts, the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing 
held by the Tax Commission, and applicable law? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard for review of the Tax Commission's decision is 
set forth in Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4), which provides in pertinent part: 
(4) The Appellate Court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(g) The agency action is based on a 
determination of fact made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) The agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior 
practice, unless the agency justifies 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons 
that demonstrate a fair and rational 
basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Article XIII, § 2 of the Utah Constitution: 
All tangible property in the state, not 
exempt under the laws of the United States, or 
under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a 
uniform and equal rate in proportion to its 
value, to ascertained as provided by law. 
Utah Code Ann- § 59-2-103(1): 
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be 
assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate 
on the basis of its fair market value, as 
valued on January 1• 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201(1)(a)(b): 
(1) By May 1 the following property shall be 
assessed by the commission at 100% of fair 
market value, as valued on January 1, in 
accordance with this chapter: 
(a) all property which operates as 
a unit across county lines, if the 
values must be apportioned among 
more than one county or state; 
(b) all property of public 
utilities . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(6): 
(6) "Fair market value" means the amount of 
which property would change hands between a 
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither 
being under any compulsion to buy or sell and 
both having reasonable knowledge of the 
relevant facts. 
The standard for review is set forth in the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, previously cited. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is a property tax valuation appeal. Questar Pipeline 
Company ("Questar") has appealed the FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL DECISION of the Utah State Tax 
Commission ("Commission") dated December 3, 1990, (Appeal No. 88-
1456), wherein the Commission found the fair market value of 
Questar's operating property for 1988 to be $296 million. (R. 
9.) In determining fair market value, the Commission found tne 
market and income approaches to value to be more reflective of 
actual market conditions than the cost approach to value, (R. 
9.) Accordingly the Commission found the cost approach to be 
least reliable and the income approach to be most reliable. The 
stock and debt approach tested the reliability of the other two 
approaches. (R. 9.) 
II. Course of the Proceedings 
On April 29, 1988, the Property Tax Division of the Tax 
Commission1 issued to Questar its 1988 property tax assessment 
1
 The Property Tax Division is one of several divisions within 
the Tax Commission. It is responsible for, among other things, the 
valuation of public utilities for ad valorem purposes. (See Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-201(1)). 
When a centrally assessed taxpayer appeals from a valuation, 
the matter is set for formal adjudication before the Commission. 
At formal hearing, the Commission's function is to weigh the 
evidence presented by the taxpayer and the Property Tax Division in 
determining the fair market value of the taxpayer's property. 
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of Questar's property, determining its fair market value to be 
$300,000,000. Subsequently, on May 31, 1988, Questar filed a 
petition for redetermination and hearing. (R. 398.) Prior to 
the hearing for redetermination, Questar and the Property Tax 
Division stipulated to values for each of the three appraisal 
approaches to value utilized to determine the fair market value 
of Questar's operating property. The only issue for resolution 
at the hearing was how these three approaches should be 
correlated to arrive at a final fair market value for Questar's 
property. 
On March 26, 1990, a hearing was held before the Commission 
at which Questar and the Property Tax Division presented expert 
witnesses who testified regarding the most reliable way to 
correlate the three valuation approaches to arrive at a final 
market value. (R. 16.) Questar argued that the cost approach, a 
method which attempts to estimate the value of property based on 
original cost with an adjustment for depreciation, was the most 
reliable method for determining fair market value. However, the 
Property Tax Division presented evidence showing the fair market 
value of Questar's property is more accurately measured by the 
income method and the stock and debt method since both of these 
methods are market-based. 
Ill. Decision of the Tax Commission 
On December 3, 1990, the Tax Commission issued its final 
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decision. (R. 11.) Based upon the evidence before it, the Tax 
Commission found "that the cost approach is the least reliable 
[indicator of value] and the income approach is the most 
reliable. The stock and debt approach tests the reliability of 
the other two approaches." (R. 9.) Consistent with those 
findings, and within the range of values presented to the 
Commission at the hearing, the Tax Commission determined that the 
fair market value of Questar's property for 1988 was $296 
million. (R. 9.) Subsequently, Questar sought this Court's 
review of that decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ G3-46b-16 
and 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii)(Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Questar is a Utah corporation engaged in the interstate 
transportation, sale, and storage of natural gas in Utah, 
Wyoming, and Colorado, (R. 6-) Questar's operations are subject 
to regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. (R. 
29.) When the assessment was made, Questar was a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Entrada Industries, which was a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Questar Corporation. (R. 21.) Questar's plant and 
equipment represented approximately 29% of Questar Corporation's 
total assets, its revenues accounted for approximately 33% of the 
parent corporation's gross revenues, and its payroll was 
approximately 20%. Questar Corporation's other activities 
include gas distribution (Mountain Fuel), oil production, brick 
manufacturing, and telecommunication services. (R. 28.) 
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On or about April 7, 1988, the Property Tax Division 
submitted to Questar a preliminary assessment2 which valued 
Questar's property at $300 million for the 1988 tax year. After 
reviewing the initial assessment with Questar, the Property Tax 
Division submitted a final property assessment of $300 million. 
This assessment was made by one of the Division's appraisers, Mr. 
Eckhardt Prawitt. Mr, Prawitt valued Questar's operating 
property using traditional valuation techniques. These 
techniques required the appraiser to consider the three 
approaches to value, namely, cost, income and market. 
Questar paid the assessment under protest and petitioned for 
a hearing and redetermination of its assessment on May 31, 1988. 
(R. 398-401-) On May 11, 1989, the Property Tax Division, 
seeking to settle the dispute between itself and Questar, 
reevaluated its prior assessment and adjusted its valuation 
downward to $292,000,000. (R. 184.) 
Prior to the hearing, Questar and the Property Tax Division 
stipulated to final values of each of the three approaches to 
value. (R. 380.) The parties further stipulated that they would 
not challenge the underlying calculations of each method, rather 
just the "correlationf: of these values or "weight" to be assigned 
2
 It has been the Property Tax Division's practice to provide 
Questar with a preliminary property tax assessment prior to issuing 
its official assessment. This allows Questar to review the figures 
and to discuss the assessment with the Division prior to the 
official assessment. (R. 31.) 
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to each approach to arrive at a final market value for Questar's 
property. (R. 380.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission contends that Questar's operating property 
for 1988 is was $296 million. Its findings are supported by 
substantial, competent evidence. The Commission urges this Court 
to affirm its determination. 
Considerable evidence was presented at the formal hearing 
supporting the Commission's finding that the income and stock and 
debt approaches to value were superior approaches to value than 
the cost approach. Dr. Hanke, Professor of Applied Economics at 
John Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, and Michael 
Goodwin, an expert appraiser with seventeen years experience 
joined with the Property Tax appraiser Mr. Echardt Prawitt in 
testifying that the stock and debt and income approaches to value 
are market-oriented and deserving of greater weight than the cost 
approach. These witnesses all testified that the cost approach 
had little relevance to fair market value in this case. 
Questar's expert witness, Professor Hal Keaton, analyzed the 
stipulated values to the three approaches through a mathematical 
formula that measured the standard deviation between the three 
approaches. This analysis did not appear related to a fair 
market value determination. Moreover, Professor Heaton 
admittedly, did not consider his analysis to be an appraisal, but 
simply a statistical relationship of the three approaches. 
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Furthermore, the actions of the Commission were not 
arbitrary and capricious. After weighing the evidence in light 
of the values of the three approaches stipulated to by Questar 
and the Property Tax Division, the Commission adopted a value 
within a range of values recommended by the Property Tax Division 
appraiser, and determined the fair market value of Questar's 
operating property to be $296 million. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The ultimate issue before this court is whether the 
Commission's determination of the fair market value of Questar's 
operating property for 1988 is supported by substantial evidence. 
After considering the evidence at hearing including testimony by 
several expert witnesses, the Commission determined the fair 
market value to be $296 million, Questar contends that it should 
be $231 million. 
In reaching its conclusion of value, the Commission 
considered the three traditional approach to value, namely, the 
cost approach, the income approach, and market approach. The 
value of each of the three approaches was stipulated to by 
Questar and the Property Tax Division. The task of the 
Commission was to weigh the merits of each approach and reconcile 
or correlate the three approaches to value into one opinion of 
fair market value. 
II. 
THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Although a ruling by the Commission on the fair market value 
of Petitioner's property resolves a question of law, the 
determination of fair market value itself is a factual question. 
Because it is a factual determination, the proceedings below and 
9 
the findings of the Commission are subject to review by this 
Court under the "substantial evidence" test. This test, as 
articulated in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g), provides that 
relief shall be granted only if a person seeking judicial review 
has been substantially injured by agency action that is not 
supported by "substantial evidence." 
In appellate review, "substantial evidence" is that quantum 
and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a 
reasonable mind to support a conclusion. First Nat'l Bank of 
Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 
P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 
'scintilla' of evidence . . . though 'something less than the 
weight of the evidence'". (Citations omitted). Grace Drilling 
v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989). 
The "substantial evidence" test requires review of the whole 
record, including evidence that both supports the agency factual 
findings and evidence that fairly detracts from the weight of the 
evidence. Id., at 68. 
In applying the substantial evidence test, this Court is to 
take cognizance of the expertise of the agency and its particular 
field and give some deference to its determination. First Nat'l 
Bank, supra. Moreover, the party challenging the agency's action 
must "marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and 
show that despite the supporting facts and in light of the 
conflicting contradictory evidence, the findings are not 
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supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling, supra. 
The focus of Questar's challenge in this matter is the Tax 
Commission findings in paragraphs 8 and 9 of its final decision. 
(R. 9.) Specifically, Questar takes exception to the 
Commission's finding that (1) the market and income approaches to 
value were more reflective of market value than the cost approach 
to value, and (2) that the fair market value of Petitioner's 
operating property for 1988, was $296 million. These findings, 
however, are clearly supported by the evidence after reviewing 
the record as a whole. 
A. THE MARKET AND INCOME APPROACHES TO VALUE ARE MORE 
REFLECTIVE OF ACTUAL MARKET CONDITIONS THAN IS THE COST 
APPROACH TO VALUE. 
Traditional appraisal recognizes three approaches to value, 
namely, cost, income and market. Each of these approaches is 
based on differing rationale. Since public utilities rarely 
sell, the approaches act as surrogates for determining fair 
market value. At the hearing below, the parties stipulated to 
the values indicated by each approach. These stipulated values 
are set forth below in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
Stipulated Values 
($ in millions) 
Cost Approach $210 
Income Approach $303 
Market Approach $312 
(Stock and Debt) 
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This appeal, in large part, debates the merits these three 
value indicators and their accuracy in forecasting fair market 
value. 
Unlike most valuation appeals before the Commission, which 
debate the values indicated by the three approaches, this appeal 
questions only the theoretical application of the value 
approaches. The values indicated by each approach are not in 
dispute. (R. 380-381.) The parties assumed that the three value 
indicators were unbiased and did not have a tendency to 
undervalue or overvalue Questar's property. 
A. (By Professor Heaton) The issues, as I understand 
it, is the appropriate selection of weights for the 
three value indicators and the binding constraint in my 
view is that I was told to assume that each of the 
three indicators of value were unbiased, statistically 
unbiased; that is, there was not a tendency to 
undervalue or overvalue the properties. 
(R. 62, emphasis added.) 
The relevance of the three approaches to value can be best 
understood by considering the definition of fair market value. 
Fair market value is defined by statute to mean the amount at 
which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a 
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell 
and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. . . . 
(Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(6)). This definition suggests that a 
consensus of willing buyers and sellers would present the best 
indication of value. Since fair market value is set by market 
participants or investors, (i.e. willing buyer and willing 
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seller) logic suggests the best approach to determine value would 
be to analyze what these market participants are doing. 
The cost approach to value looks at what it would cost for a 
willing buyer to reconstruct the subject property. Analysis of 
this approach requires consideration of economic and functional 
obsolescence. See Pacific Power and Light Co, v. Department of 
Revenue, 775 P.2d 303 (Or, 1989) 
The income approach analyzes the income stream that will be 
generated by the property. The value of property results from 
the use to which it is put and varies with the profitableness of 
that use, present and prospective, actual and anticipate. 
Cleveland et al Ry, Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 439 (1894). In other 
words, the value of property is the present worth of future 
benefits (income stream) generated by that property. (R. 166.) 
The stock and debt approach is a surrogate for the market or 
sales comparison approach. It measures the value of property by 
valuing the underlying stock and debt of a corporation. The sum 
of the value of the stock and debt represents the value of the 
corporate assets under the concept that assets equal liabilities 
plus owner's equity. Since these securities are ofttimes traded 
in the market, their values can readily be ascertained. 
Dr. Steve Hanke, professor of applied economics at John 
Hopkin's University in Baltimore, Maryland, testified for the 
Property Tax Division with respect to the relevance and 
application of this latter approach: 
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Q. (By Mr. [Dever]) Dr. Hanke, there has 
been some discussion of the three basic 
appraisal methods so far today. I think we 
all understand what the three of them are. 
My basic question is to you. Do you have an 
opinion that one of the methods is superior 
to the other two? 
A. Yes I do. 
Q. Which one is that? 
A. I think the stock and debt approach is 
the superior approach, giving the objective 
of attempting to determine the fair market 
value, because it is a market based indicator 
whereas the other two are not. 
Q. Does it have certain aspects of it that 
you consider to make it superior other than 
just those? 
A. Well, the primary aspect that makes it 
superior is that it provides an anchor when 
valuing property as to its fair market value 
that's determined by a consensus of people 
who are actually putting their own wealth at 
risk in the market place, buyers and sellers 
who are actively engaged in the market. . . . 
(R. 122. emphasis added.) 
Although Dr. Hanke preferred the stock and debt approach, he 
testified that the next best indicator was the income approach. 
A. (By Dr. Hanke) . . . I think the stock 
and debt is the only valuation method that 
reflects values that are primarily at their 
source derived from a consensus of market 
participants and that the other approaches 
are inferior, with one that is totally 
unacceptable in principle, being the cost 
approach. It has nothing to do with what 
people would pay for an asset and should 
never be used. 
The income approach in some case can be 
14 
used when the stock and debt approach is not 
appropriate. The most extreme case obviously 
would be if you had a privately held company 
where no shares were traded, no debt was 
traded or anything like that. Obviously you 
would have to go to a fall back position, and 
instead of relying on a consensus of market 
participants who generate a market price as 
your core base value, you then would have to 
go to the subjective evaluation of a single 
or a group of analysts or appraisers. 
(R. 135.) 
In Dr. Hanke's opinion, cost was accorded little or no 
weight. 
A. (By Dr. Hanke) . . . The cost may or -may 
not have some coincidence with market value, 
but there is no causal link between cost and 
market value. 
(R. 126.) 
Michael Goodwin, an independent fee appraiser of seventeen 
years with several appraisal designations, also testified for the 
Property Division and ranked the stock and debt and income 
approaches as superior to the cost approach.3 
3
 Mr. Goodwin testified at the hearing not only as an expert 
appraiser, but also as an investor, who at one time had attempted 
to purchase a pipeline. 
Q. (By Mr. Sackett) I would assume, Mr. 
Goodwin, that you have never been seriously in 
the market to buy a pipeline; is that correct? 
A. (By Mr. Goodwin) As a matter of fact, 
that's not correct. 
Q. You're fixing to buy a pipeline someplace? 
A. As a matter of fact I came very close to 
purchasing a pipeline. 
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Q. In general, then could you talk about the 
weight you think should be applied to various 
indicators of value as applied to this 
particular case? 
A. In this particular circumstance, if I 
could speak of them in some kind of rank, I 
would generally look at—and this depends on 
the type of company—but in this particular 
case I would generally look at that the stock 
and debt indicator and the income approach 
more or less equivalently, balancing between 
the two, generally speaking, relegating the 
cost indicator typically to a lower level of 
significance. My personal opinion in this 
particular case and in similar cases like 
this is that the cost indicator is not a very 
refined indicator of value and it does not 
have a great deal of reliability in 
indicating market value. 
The other two indicators I think would 
be preferable and would certainly by far 
deserve greater emphasis in a correlation 
process. 
(R. 210.) 
Mr. Goodwin's reasoning was based on how closely the results 
mirrored the market. 
A. . . . I think the chief reason that one 
would want to put a significant amount of 
emphasis on the stock and debt indicator is 
that it does come directly from market 
prices; and, secondly, it does not cause the 
analyst to interject his opinion's per se 
into that process. 
Q. A pipeline regulated by the FERC? 
A. Yes sir. And the Kansas Corp. Commission 
in the State of Kansas. A gas pipeline, I 
might add. 
(R. 235.) 
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(R. 211.) 
Like Dr. Hanke, Mr. Goodwin testified that cost has little 
relevance. 
A. . . . There are few investors, in my 
opinion, in this particular kind of 
marketplace who place a great deal of 
credence in the historical cost figures, when 
their primary emphasis in my opinion is the 
expected cash flow stream which they might 
achieve by purchasing the assets in the first 
place. 
(R. 212.) 
The appraiser for the Property Division, Mr.'Eckhardt 
Prawitt, further pointed out why the income and stock and debt 
approaches are superior indicators of value. 
A. . . . Regarding the [income indicator] we 
consider this the best of the three 
indicators. When valuing income producing 
property, because of the financial principle 
that the value of the property is its sum of 
the future income stream discounted to 
present value. The Division primarily uses 
the direct capitalization method which 
eliminates the need to rely on subjective 
estimates with regard to the shape and 
duration of the income streams. 
(R. 166.) 
A. . . . With respect to the stock and debt 
indicator this is the only indicator of the 
three that derives its value from direct 
market evidence; namely, the actual trading 
of the company's securities. In the case of 
the pure utility whose securities are 
publicly traded, this would be the most 
objective of the three indicators of value. 
And in my opinion I would place at least as 
much weight on it as I would the [income 
indicator] of value. 
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(R. 167.) 
Mr. Prawitt also pointed out the flaw in relying on the cost 
approach: 
Q. Now, do you believe that there's 
something unique about Questar as opposed to 
other companies that would cause you to give 
great weight to a particular indicator or to 
indicators as opposed to treating the 
indicators equally. 
A. Yes. The cost approach. In the cost 
approach, Questar is not a new pipeline. I 
don't know its exact age, but I believe its 
composite age is around fifteen years. So I 
wouldn't put very much faith in the cost* 
indicator regardless of the fact that it is 
regulated. 
(R. 168.) 
Questar's expert witness, Hal Heaton, took an entirely 
different focus in his analysis, a focus which did not appear to 
the Commission to be market oriented. 
HEARING OFFICER: Why is that a mere accurate 
representation of fair market value? 
WITNESS: (Hal Heaton) You had three 
indicators with three different numbers. 
Which of these is the best? And I am going 
to place weights on those based on my 
judgment of the quality, and the way I 
measure quality is with the standard 
deviations. 
HEARING OFFICER: Quality of what? 
WITNESS: Of the estimate. 
HEARING OFFICER: And to you that is sheerly 
a mathematical calculation; that you measure 
quality strictly by making a mathematical 
calculation? 
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WITNESS: Well, I tried to measure it 
mathematically. I mean, if I'm going to 
place a number on it, I have to some how take 
this judgment and convert it into a number. 
Yes. I tried to convert it into a number, 
because ultimately that's what you have to 
do. You have to assess tax based on a 
number. So whatever the judgment and the 
concept is, you eventually have to cram that 
into a number. So, yes. 
(R. 107.) 
Rather than measure the quality of each value approach to 
value by its relationship to fair market value, Professor Heaton 
simply measured the standard deviation between the three value 
approaches. His analysis was based on a statistical comparison 
of the three (3) stipulated value approaches. There was no 
relationship to fair market value. 
Questar has argued to this Court that reliance on the stock 
and debt approach is contrary to the Commission's policy 
articulated in Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Property Tax Div. of 
the Utah State Tax Comm'n, Appeals No. 85-0074 and 86-0255. On 
page 5 of its decision (R. 10), the Commission refuted Questar's 
argument and distinguished the facts of the Questar case from the 
Northwest Pipeline decision. 
That case does not change the result here. The 
parent company in Northwest Pipeline was a nonpublic 
corporation, whereas here, Questar Corp. is publicly 
traded. There is also some indication that 
Petitioner's portion of the total business of its 
parent corporation is a larger portion than that which 
was present in Northwest Pipeline. The difficulties 
present in that case, which rendered the stock and debt 
approach inappropriate, are not present here. 
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(R. 10-11). 
To better understand the fallacy of Questar's argument, 
consider the decision of the Commission in Northwest Pipeline: 
The stock and debt indicator of value is 
difficult to apply to the Petitioner. 
Petitioner is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
the Williams Company, a privately owned, non-
public corporation. The parent corporation 
raises capital by the issuance of its own 
debt and that capital is then utilized in the 
business operations of the Williams Company 
and its several subsidiaries including 
Petitioner. Therefore, it is very difficult 
to determine what portion of the stock and 
debt of the Williams Company should be 
allocated to Petitioner. Further, there is 
no specific information available concerning 
the market value of the nonpublic stock. 
Because of the difficulties associated with 
accurately allocating a portion of the equity 
value of the parent companies nonpublicly 
traded stock to Petitioner, two tiers down, 
we find that the stock and debt indicator is 
the least reliable of the three traditional 
indicators and wil] be given little, if any 
weight. 
(R. 10.) 
The rationale of the Northwest Pipeline decision is premised 
on the belief that the parent company to Northwest Pipeline, the 
Williams Companies, Inc. was a privately owned, nonpublic 
corporation that raised capital by issuance of its own debt and 
passed it along to its several subsidiaries. This made it 
difficult to determine what portion of stock and debt of the 
Williams Companies, Inc. should be allocated to the Northwest 
Pipeline. 
In this case however, the parent corporation to Questar 
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Pipeline is Questar Corporation. Questar Corporation is a 
publicly traded corporation. Moreover, its subsidiary, Questar 
Pipeline has its own debt. (R. 224.) The rationale underlying 
the Northwest Pipeline decision is simply not present in this 
case. 
During direct examination Dr. Hanke touched on this question 
of valuing a subsidiary of a publicly held corporation. His 
comments are insightful: 
Q. Dr. Hanke, there has been some testimony 
that Questar Pipeline we know has not traded 
per se. Its part of the large conglomerate 
of Questar Corporation is valuing this 
Questar Pipeline, which is part of this in 
effect reliability approach that we are using 
here just simply because it has not been 
actually traded itself? 
A. If you go back to page 9 on the exhibit, 
the firm, the entire firm, not holding the 
pipeline distribution company, the [brick 
making] operation and so forth and so on is 
valued objectively and correctly at the unit 
level, the firm level and that information 
then, following the flow chart from the top 
right hand corner all the way around, bingo, 
you get appraisers' opinions. 
And what goes in there in the matter of 
Questar is it is the stock and debt fair 
market valuation or should go in there in my 
opinion, the fair market value based on the 
stock and debt evaluation of the unit—or, 
the firm. 
Now, the appraiser has to come in and 
make some judgment calls, and the judgment 
call, the critical one in this case, is 
getting down to the pipeline level from the 
unit itself, the total unit. 
My argument is that this is the 
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appropriate place to make the judgment, 
because you started with the right anchor, 
you have the right market valuation for the 
total unit, and you then make the judgments 
based on [the] fair market value of the total 
unit. And, of course, you are going to have 
to do a unit valuation with other techniques 
that are used, anyway, and make allocations 
on down the line. 
My argument is that the other methods 
for determining the unit values are not 
appropriate. There are subjective 
evaluations or personal opinions of personal 
individuals or firms doing the valuations. 
They are not the opinions expressed by the 
market participants that are objective. 
Market prices are objective, and the unit 
value is objective. 
(R. 135-136.) 
Because the parent company, Questar Corporation, is public 
traded, valuing the company at the parent level starts the 
process from an objective market-based viewpoint. Allocating 
from that viewpoint is no more subjective than the assumptions 
made in either the income or cost approaches. 
Mike Goodwin further testified that even the allocation 
process was reasonably objective since Questar Pipeline had its 
own long term debt. The only subjective allocation dealt with 
allocating the stock. 
Q. And have you heard how the State performs 
its allocation? 
A. Yes. I am aware of how they did that. 
Q. In your opinion is this an acceptable 
method to make an allocation? 
A. It is, particularly in light of the other 
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information which is available in all of the 
published financial data. One can obviously 
see a range of allocation data applicable to 
just Questar's common stock. But certainly 
the numbers and the factors used by the state 
were reasonable in my opinion. 
They are also used fairly widely 
throughout the country to do this type of 
allocation. I myself have used this factor, 
earnings and other factors to do the same 
kind of calculation in a variety of 
appraisals. 
I might point out, if I could Mr. Dever, 
we're only talking at this point about the 
common stock. I don't know if it was very 
clear in earlier testimony, but there 
shouldn't be any dispute about the long term 
debt values in this particular case, because 
Questar Pipeline had its own long term debt. 
If you were to look at the work papers 
of the state, I think you will see that we 
are talking about $100 million to $150 
million of value in the stock and debt 
indicator, which is not subject to any kind 
of allocation. So we are really talking when 
you ask me those questions, only the common 
stock part of that total value. There is a 
substantial amount of money that's not in 
dispute in my opinion or at least it 
shouldn't be. It's fairly straight forward 
in value and long term debt and current 
liabilities. Those are pretty simple. What 
we have been talking are really the common 
stock allocations. And I should point out, 
any kind of variation, as Dr. Heaton referred 
to, that would seem to in his view added a 
degree of reliability or otherwise only 
pertains to the common stock. It does not 
pertain to the entire process as he has 
analyzed it . . . 
(R. 223-224.) 
Questar is simply wrong in trying to align itself with the 
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facts of the Northwest Pipeline decision. 
Questar attempted to carry its argument one step further 
when it filed a Supplemental Brief with this Court. The 
Supplemental Brief was filed because Questar discovered that 
Williams Companies, Inc. in the Northwest Pipeline case, was 
publicly traded, not privately held as believed by the 
Commission. Questar therefore reasoned that since its parent 
corporation also traded publicly, it was now analogous to the 
facts in Northwest Pipeline since Williams Companies, Inc. also 
traded publicly. Accordingly, Questar assumed that the rationale 
of the Commission in Northwest Pipeline must also apply to 
Questar thereby supporting its argument that the stock and debt 
approach should be given little weight. This reasoning, however, 
is flawed. Whether Williams Companies, Inc. was publicly or 
privately traded is absolutely irrelevant to their argument. 
The Northwest Pipeline decision was premised on the 
assumption that Williams Companies, Inc. was a privately held 
corporation. This premise formed the basis of the Commission's 
conclusion not to rely heavily on the stock and debt approach. 
Although the premise may have been inaccurate, the reasoning that 
followed was not.4 Moreover, to modify the underlying premise 
A
 During direct examination, Dr. Hanke affirmed the validity 
of this reasoning. (R. 135.) 
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of a ruling will in effect modify the entire ruling.5 In other 
words, learning that Williams Companies, Inc. was a public rather 
than a private corporation affects only the Northwest Pipeline 
decision—not this decision. The policy underlying the Northwest 
Pipeline decision is sound. Questar Corporation is a public 
corporation with stocks that are traded daily on the market. The 
stock and debt approach becomes highly relevant since it is 
objective and market-based. 
Turning to another point, Questar has also taken exception 
to the Commission's finding (R. 11, 5 9) that the cost approach 
is the least reliable approach to value, the income approach is 
the most reliable approach, and the stock and debt approach tests 
the reliability of the income and cost approaches. Questar 
argues there was no direct testimony establishing that finding. 
Whether there was or was not direct testimony to that effect, 
there was evidence sufficient for this Court to infer such a 
finding. 
All witnesses for the Property Division testified of the 
relative weakness of the cost approach and the strength of the 
stock and debt and income approaches. The Property Tax Division 
appraiser, Eckhardt Prawitt, testified that in his opinion the 
5
 To support its contention, Questar asked this Court to take 
judicial notice of the fact that Williams is publicly traded. 
While the Commission does not dispute this fact, it was 
inappropriate for Questar to use 1986 and 1987 data when the only 
data relevant to the Northwest Pipeline decision was data from 1984 
and 1985. 
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income approach was the best of the three approaches. 
A. . . . Regarding the [income indicator], 
we consider this the best of the three 
indicators. When valuing income-producing 
property, because of the financial principle 
that the value of the property is its sum of 
the future income stream discounted to 
present value. The Division primarily uses 
the direct capitalization method, which 
eliminates the need to rely on subjective 
estimates with regard to the shape and 
duration of the income streams. 
The competence of this method is 
dependent on the quality of the income steam 
and the quality of the capitalization rate as 
well as the degree of matching between the 
two. 
(R. 166.) 
Moreover, there was significant testimony that the stock and 
debt approach was market-oriented and objective, more so than 
either the income or cost, (R. 122-126.) By inference then, the 
stock and debt approach, being market-based and objective, would 
be a good cross check to the other two approaches which were more 
subjective in nature. 
B. THE COST APPROACH IS THE LEAST RELIABLE 
INDICATOR OF VALUE. 
At the hearing below, considerable testimony was directed to 
the application and weaknesses of the cost approach to value. 
The general consensus of all expert witnesses testifying for the 
Property Tax Division was that the cost approach in this case had 
little relevance to value, even though Questar was subject to 
rate base regulation. 
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The reasoning behind this concept was, perhaps, best 
expressed by Dr. Hanke in his response to direct examination by 
Mr. Dever: 
Q. Now, when we talk about the cost 
approach, what is your opinion of the cost 
approach and how it is used? 
A. Well, the cost approach tells you how 
much it would cost either at cost originally 
to build something or how much it would cost 
to replace it; but it doesn't tell you how 
much the asset would exchange for it in the 
market. It has nothing—there is no causal 
link between cost approach and market value. 
An this is, there kind of glaring examples. 
You can have a—lets say I build a house for 
$100,000, and it will cost $100,000 to 
replace it. It burns down, and the 
neighborhood that I am in has deteriorated 
over the years so that in fact the market 
transactions that are occurring in the 
neighborhood for identical houses are 
$75,000, I'm not going to come in and insist 
that the fair market value of the thing is 
$100,000 when in fact there are comparable 
sales going on all around the neighborhood at 
$7 5,000. The cost may or may not have some 
coincidence with market value, but there is 
no causal link between cost and market value. 
(R. 125-126, emphasis added.) 
Cost is not value. Unlike the market and income approaches, 
the cost approach is not market-based. 
Mr. Goodwin, both an appraiser and an investor, stated: 
A. Part of the problem is that you are 
dealing with really a fractional or summation 
sort of approach with a cost approach. And 
part of the real reason that it isn't very 
applicable in these kinds of circumstances is 
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that investors simply don't think that way. 
There are few investors in my opinion in this 
particular kind of market place who place a 
great deal of credence in historical figures 
when their primary emphasis in my opinion is 
the expected cash flow stream which they 
might achieve by purchasing the assets in the 
first place. 
As I said, I think earlier, Mr. [Dever], 
the cost approach in my view is really a 
quite unrefined kind of number in this 
process for this kind of company partly 
because of the imperfections in the 
regulatory arena as well, but chiefly because 
the investor himself does not place a lot of 
credence in my opinion on such a number. 
(R. 211-212. ) 
Professor Heaton in testifying for Questar was told to 
assume that the cost approach was unbiased. His entire analysis, 
including assumptions and conclusions were based on that premise. 
However, outside of the assumption that the cost approach was 
unbiased, there was some testimony by Professor Heaton suggesting 
that in past appraisals he had put little weight on the cost 
approach. 
Q. (By Mr. Dever) Now, Dr. Heaton, haven't 
you previously testified in Court hearings 
that you didn't put much weight in the cost 
approach? 
A. Two qualifications. One, I was told to 
assume for purposes of this hearing that the 
estimators were unbiased. My concern in the 
previous cases was that the cost indicator 
was a biased value. I was told to ignore 
bias for this case. 
Q. So your answer is yes. Previously you 
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have testified that there is not a lot of 
weight, but you don't believe that it's 
applicable in this particular case? 
A. Because I was told to accept the values 
as unbiased indicators. 
(R. 115.) 
In its opening Brief, Questar has proffered the argument 
that because Questar is subject to rate base regulation by FERC, 
far greater weight must be placed on the cost indicator. This 
argument, however, flies in the face of contrary evidence 
presented at the hearing. 
During the hearing, counsel for Questar raised this argument 
with several of the witnesses. While acknowledging that revenues 
in some degree are constrained by the determination of the rate 
base, Dr. Hanke thoroughly refuted the suggested relationship 
between fair market value and rate base. 
Q. So isn't it fair to say that the revenues 
of the pipeline are constrained, at least to 
the extent that the rate base is an element 
of that equation by what the regulator 
determines the rate base to be? Isn't that 
right? 
A. In some degree, the revenues are 
constrained by the determination of the rate 
base. I agree. 
Q. So it's not really accurate to say is it 
that the cost method to the extent that it's 
very close to the determination of the rate 
base is just someone's subjective judgment of 
the value of the company because here we have 
an example where the value directly derives a 
revenue strength; isn't that correct? 
A. No, that is incorrect. That's where 
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you've made the mistake. If that was the 
case, what you're jumping to, you're mixing 
things up here, because you have this rate 
regulation going on the one hand, but we're 
trying to get fair market value on the other 
hand and those are two separate things 
although they might give the appearance of 
being true. If they were equal to each other 
the stock and debt approach would give you 
whatever the rate base was. The two numbers 
would be the same. 
Q. Wouldn't that be true only if the entity 
we're talking about had actively traded 
public common shares available to the market 
place. 
A. Well, just for the sake of argument, 
there are plenty of firms that look like that 
and the rate base will be different than the 
stock and debt market base valuation. Any 
you go—again, using this kind of logic, you 
can go to the market and look at market 
prices versus book. 
You know, what you're saying is that we 
don't even need a market, why do we need a 
market? Why do we need a stock market? 
You know all you have to do is just, you 
know, go to the regulators and look up what 
the rate base is, and that should be what any 
willing buyer and seller would be able to 
transact. 
Now, in the case of Questar, it's very 
clear to me that if you use a cost based 
approach to value the unit, everything they 
do, you use the same cost base methodology, 
you get a number that is lower than the stock 
and debt for the total unit. 
Now, if the insiders, the corporate 
officers and boards of—the people on the 
board of directors and so forth thought that 
the cost base approach was valid as an 
indicator of underlying value that something 
was wrong with the market based approach, 
30 
because it was higher, you know what they 
would be doing. They would be net short in 
the market for the stock. 
Well, they're not net short. They are 
net long. They are holders of shares on 
balance. So that they have a comfort level, 
obviously with a market valuation of what 
they perceive personally in their own 
personal subjective valuations of the 
underlying value are. They think, if 
anything, the market prices are lower than 
their own personal subjective valuations. 
But certainly not the other way. 
(R. 139-142.) 
Mr. Prawitt, the Property Division Appraiser, corroborated 
Dr. Hanke's testimony and provided further insight into this 
analysis: 
A. . . . When talking earlier about the cost 
approach, I mentioned a sanity test I believe 
may apply at times. One of these is a 
comparison of the company's shares, prices to 
its book per share of value, or book value 
per share commonly referred to as the market 
to book ratio. 
In looking at that April 8, 1933 value 
line report on Questar Corporation, I 
observed a market to book ratio of 1.38. 
Q. What does that mean? 
A. What this means is that on the average 
the market value of that portion of the 
assets that the shareholder is entitled to is 
worth 1.38 times the value of the net book 
value of those same assets. However, I 
should say that the report prior to—the 
value lines report in December or January, 
the book—price to book ratio is only 1:28 
and I think for the history, after 
eliminating some outliers and what not, I 
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think it settles down to somewhere in the 
neighborhood of 1.3 I would guess. 
(R. 169.) 
In spite of this testimony, Questar contends that because a 
willing buyer would indeed be cognizant of the company's 
regulation, such a fact must therefore significantly affect the 
selling price, biasing it towards the cost approach. However, 
Mr. Goodwin addressed this point and summed up generally the flaw 
behind Questar's reasoning: 
Q. You indicated fairly early in your 
testimony that the investor was generally 
cognizant of the utility rate base or 
regulatory rate base. Isn't that correct? 
A. The investor would be cognizant of that 
process and would be aware generally of the 
net book figures, I think, at any one point 
in time. 
Q. You don't disagree with the previous 
characterizations that the revenue stream of 
the pipeline is determined by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission's rate making 
process, do you? 
A. I'm not sure exactly what character-
ization you referred to at this point. I do 
disagree that the revenue stream generated by 
this kind of tax payer and this one in 
particular in necessarily defined with any 
degree of certainty by that process over 
time. That is not the case. 
There are market imperfections, not the 
least of which are differences of opinion 
between investors as to the rigidness or 
laxity by which this company and other 
companies like it are regulated. If it were 
a perfect world, there may be some one to one 
relationship, but that's far from the case 
32 
Mr. Sackett. 
Q. Did you not say that investors or—yes 
investors would look at the expected cash 
flow stream of a perspective company? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. And you disagreed with the proposition 
that cash flow stream of Questar Pipeline is 
explicitly determined by its regulatory 
overseer, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission in the establishment of its rates 
and charges? 
A. I disagree to the point that—shall I 
finish? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I disagree to the extent that I just 
indicated. And if I could perhaps try it 
again. The way you frame the question, it 
sounds as though when the regulator gets done 
and sort of turns the key and the lights go 
off at night, everybody in the world knows 
what Questar is going to make next year. 
That is not the case. There are 
imperfections in that regulatory process 
which do not necessarily with any degree of 
certainty let us say for sure what those cash 
flows will be in the future in the next 
number of years. And secondly, and probably 
more importantly, the investor has his own 
view of the regulatory process and whether 
that arena is a good arena or a bad arena, 
lets say, in the sense of generating cash 
flows, it doesn't make much difference 
whether you and I Mr. Sackett believe that 
the regulator does his job well or not. 
Its the guy who puts the money on the 
line and buys stock in Questar Corp. who 
finally says: "Yes, as a matter of fact I'll 
pay 28 percent more than book value for this 
company because I think the regulatory arena 
has in fact been official perhaps to this 
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company. 
And that is the case in this particular 
instance. We have about 1.3 market to book 
ratio based on the calculations I made. 
(R. 229-231.) 
In further support of its cost/rate base argument, Questar 
cites Boston Edison Company v. Board of Assessors, 439 N.E. 2d 
763 (Mass. 1982). However, Boston Edison is distinguishable from 
this case. Its facts are substantially different. The 
methodology competing with the cost/rate base method in Boston 
Edison was different from the methods in this case. The Boston 
Edison Court never considered an income or stock and debt 
approach to value. Moreover, unlike Boston Edison, there was 
substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's 
decision to place greater reliance on the income and stock and 
debt approaches than on the cost approach. Not only did Questar 
agree that the values indicated by the income and stock and debt 
approaches were in excess of the cost approach, but the testimony 
of Dr. Hanke, Mr. Goodwin, and Mr. Prawitt provided adequate 
evidence to adopt these approaches to the exclusion of the cost 
approach. 
Questar also cites Montana Power Co. v. FERC, 599 F.2d 295 
(9th Cir. 1979) to point out that rate regulated facilities that 
are bought by another company will not be allowed to earn on more 
than the original depreciated cost base, even though a higher 
price may have been paid in the market place. But even in 
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Montana Power Co, the market value exceeded the cost value. This 
supports the Commission's position that market value can and does 
exceed a cost/rate base valuation. As Mr. Prawitt and Mr. 
Goodwin pointed out in their testimonies, the market to book 
ratio often exceeds 1.1. (R. 169. ) For Questar Corporation, the 
ratio ranged from 1.28 to 1.38. 
(R. 169.) 
It is important to point out that Questar does not take the 
view that the cost approach necessarily represents the fair 
market value of its operating property. On page 24 of its 
Opening Brief, Questar states, "Questar does not take the view 
that the cost/rate-base method is by itself, dispositive of the 
appraisal, nor that the rate base "caps" the value that can be 
used to assess property taxes." (Emphasis original.) 
Indeed, Questar cannot take such an extreme position since 
its own recommended value of $231 million is in excess of the 
stipulated cost approach value of $210 million. Moreover, by its 
own stipulated admission, Questar has agreed that Questar's value 
as indicated by the income and stock and debt approach is in 
excess of $300 million. To argue as Questar has on pages 18 and 
19 of its Opening Brief, is mere opinion of counsel and contrary 
to the weight of testimony presented at hearing. Questar's rate-
base argument is simply without merit. 
Questar criticizes the Tax Commission for stating that the 
cost approach is considered a reliable indicator only when 
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sufficient data and conditions are not present for the other two 
approaches. Yet, that inference can clearly be drawn from the 
evidence. 
All of the experts acknowledged the application of the three 
traditional approaches to value. Moreover, all of the expert 
witnesses for the Property Division further testified that the 
cost approach was least reliable because it had little or no 
relationship to value. They also testified that the stock and 
debt and income approaches are better indicators of value because 
they are market-oriented. If cost then is considered an 
unreliable approach to value compared to the income and stock and 
debt approaches, it logically follows that the cost approach is 
reliable only when there is insufficient data to support the 
stock and debt or income approaches. 
In summary, the evidence supports the Commission's finding 
that the cost approach of value does not accurately represent 
the fair market value of Questar's operating property and should 
be accorded little weight. 
C. THE CORRELATION OF VALUE APPROACHES IN THE APPRAISAL PROCESS 
IS A MATTER OF JUDGMENT AND CANNOT BE REDUCED TO A 
MATHEMATICAL EQUATION. 
Under the "substantial evidence" test set forth in the UAPA, 
the reviewing court is to look at evidence that supports the 
factual findings of the agency on review, as well as evidence 
that fairly detracts from the weight of the evidence. See Grace 
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Drilling, supra. Thus far in this brief, the Commission has 
presented evidence that clearly supports its findings. The 
Commission views correlation as a matter of judgment for the 
expert appraiser. In contrast, Questar argues for this Court to 
adopt an analysis that converts the task of appraisal into a 
precise mathematical calculation devoid of market analysis. 
Questar's approach to the correlation process was to analyze 
statistically the three approaches to value and to measure by 
mathematical formula the standard deviation between the 
approaches. The actual formula is set forth in Exhibit 5. 
(R. 253-264.) Note that the issue, as framed by Questar's 
witness, is what "weighting" scheme results in the lowest 
estimation error for Questar. It is not, what is the fair market 
value of Questar's property? (R. 253.) The strongest argument 
against this type of analysis is an admission by Questar's own 
expert, Professor rieaton, that his analysis was not considered an 
appraisal. 
HEARING OFFICER: Alright. Now, looking at 
those three factors, the market method or the 
stock and debt, arrives at a value of $312 
million. And your opinion of value is its 
$80 million to $90 million under that. Why 
does your judgment—what tells you that it's 
$80 to $90 million under $312 million? 
WITNESS: Okay. First of all, I'm not 
conducting an appraisal here. What I am 
trying to do is come up with the optimal 
weights. The $231 million comes out of the 
optimal weights, not my appraisal. 
So you are trying to read more into my 
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testimony than what I was trying to give. 
HEARING OFFICER: And I don't want to do 
that. 
WITNESS: I was testifying on a very narrow 
issue. It is not my appraisal of the value 
of this company. It's my best estimate is 
what it reflects, my best estimate of what 
that weighting scheme ought to be, based on 
the estimate;. . . 
(R. 107-108, emphasis added.) 
This point was reiterated again a few moments later during 
the hearing in response to another question poised by the hearing 
officer: 
HEARING OFFICER: Well, we don't—we based it 
on evidence, and that's the evidence before 
us is that $210 million is the low and $312 
million is the high. 
Now, have you given us testimony as to 
what the fair market value is someplace in 
there, or have you just given us some 
statistical calculations? Are you giving us 
testimony as to value? 
WITNESS: We are into a tight area of 
semantics here. I was—I can't answer that 
question simply. In my own mind I am not 
giving you my appraisal. In my mind I am 
giving you my best shot estimate based on the 
quality of the three estimates you have. I 
am telling you what weighting scheme you 
ought to use. Now, if that is—if you 
consider that to be an appraisal, so be it. 
In my mind I don't consider it an appraisal. 
(R. 109-110, emphasis added.) 
The Commission argues that this admission, by itself, gives 
this Court sufficient grounds to rule in favor of the Commission. 
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Professor Heaton's analysis does not conform with appraisal 
practice. 
Furthermore, not only is his analysis not considered an 
appraisal, but it did not appear to have any relationship to fair 
market value. 
Q. (By Mr. Dever) Professor Heaton, these 
three indicators of value that you 
correlated, were the indicators correlated to 
each other or to themselves, rather than to 
the market value of Questar Pipeline? 
A. Yes. (R. 115.) 
It should further be noted that when asked whether the 
Property Tax Division was wrong in its correlation process, even 
Questar's witness was unable to state with certainty that the 
analysis by the Commission was not correct. 
HEARING OFFICER: Well, if you don't know 
what they did, then you can't testify—then 
your testimony is not that it was clearly 
wrong? And I don't think this goes as much 
to your testimony as it does to perhaps the 
burden of proof that exists between the 
parties. 
WITNESS: I guess—what was clearly—when you 
say something was clearly wrong, what 
something do you have reference to? 
HEARING OFFICER: Whatever the Property Tax Division 
did, are they clearly wrong? 
WITNESS: If you mean were they clearly wrong in 
estimating the cost indicator at 210 million, no. Are 
they clearly wrong in estimating the stock market debt 
indicator at 303 million? No. Were they clearly wrong 
in coming up with a correlation—however they came up 
with it, the answer is no. The only thing I am trying 
to do is take the numbers they gave me, and using a 
mathematical derivation, come up with the best 
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estimator. 
So the elements of what they did I'm not 
saying any of that is wrong. I just take 
what they gave me and work with it. 
(R. 117-118, emphasis added.) 
Questar also claims that the income and stock and debt 
approaches are virtually identical. Questar's argument is that 
if the two indicators are the same, then the correlation process 
is in reality only between two approaches to value rather than 
three. Using Professor Heaton's statistical analysis on only two 
value approaches, he argues, would place even greater statistical 
weight on the cost approach. 
The Commission disputes the claim that these two value 
approaches are one and the same. If they were identical, they 
should yield identical values; yet they do not. The value of one 
differs from the value of the other by nine (9) million dollars. 
Unlike the stock and debt approach, the income approach looks to 
market derived earnings/price ratios whereas the stock and debt 
approach looks at the actual company specific stock and debt. 
They are two different approaches. The similarity is that they 
are both market-oriented. 
Even assuming, however, that they are identical, which the 
Commission denies, such a fact still should not imply that cost 
must be given greater weight. Appraisal is not subject to 
precise formula calculations and mathematical precision. Rather, 
it is a judgment call left for the expert appraiser to make based 
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on the quality of the underlying data. 
It is entirely conceivable that in any given appraisal, an 
appraiser might discard all but one approach to value to arrive 
at an estimate of fair market value. For instance, an appraiser 
could, if the quality of the approach warranted it, consider only 
a stock and debt value to the exclusion of either cost or income 
approaches. Or, the appraiser might consider only an income 
approach, or where the income and stock and debt approaches do 
not apply, a cost approach. The appraiser might also weigh all 
three approaches equally, or in any other combination. 
Moreover, this process may vary from year to year on the 
same property. One year, for instance, there might be a number 
of sales that could be used as a comparison to the subject 
property. In another year, there may be no sales and the income 
approach might yield the best estimate of value. Moreover, it 
may be that information on the income approach and the market 
approach simply does not exist, such as with newer properties 
recently constructed, that do not yet have histories of cash 
flows or where there are no comparable sales. In that case, the 
cost approach would receive the greatest weight. It is simply 
too rigid and unrealistic to argue and conclude that the process 
of appraisal must be set forth with mathematical certainty and 
must be measured by the standard deviation between approaches. 
Valuation is an art, not a science. It boils down to an 
intelligent exercise of judgement. It is always an estimate 
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built on a foundation of assumption. It is an attempt to 
ascertain what a public utility would sell for if it were for 
sale under ideal conditions, between a willing and knowledgeable 
buyer and a willing and eligible seller. Since there are 
relatively few sales of public utilities, and those few that are 
made are not typical, there are no comparable sales upon which to 
base value. Instead, conclusions as to market value are based on 
each appraiser's best judgment. Each appraiser approaches the 
task evaluation with his own assumptions and theories as to what 
potential buyers and sellers would or should consider in arriving 
at a price. AT&T Communications of California v. State Bd. of 
Equalization No. 500802. (Cal. Super. Ct., Co of Sacramento, 
Dept. 24, Feb. 1, 1991) The process of correlation and 
appraising requires flexibility for the appraiser who evaluates 
the underlying data for each property from year to year-
Questar has criticized the Commission for not providing a 
detailed explanation of how it arrived at a fair market 
determination of $296 million; yet, the Commission has clearly 
shown that its determination was the product of placing great 
reliance on the income and stock debt approaches and little 
reliance on the cost approach. The actual number itself was 
chosen from within the range of values recommended to the 
Commission during the hearing by Mr. Prawitt, the Property Tax 
Division appraiser. 
During the hearing, both sides suggested ranges of value for 
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the Commission to consider. Questar recommended a range between 
$220 million and $231 million. (R. 32.) The Property Division 
recommended a range between $290 million to $310 million. 
(R. 188.) The finding by the Commission of a fair market value 
of $296 million fell squarely within the range of value proffered 
by the Property Tax Division. To say there was no basis for the 
Commission's determination is simply to ignore the evidence. The 
Commission's finding of a fair market value is both rational and 
reasonable and based on substantial competent evidence. It 
should not be reguired of the Commission to resort to placing 
specific weights on each value approach. Instead, it should be 
enough to simply choose a value with the range of values 
presented to the Commission by the various witnesses. The 
Commission urges this Court to affirm its finding that the fair 
market value of Questar's property is $296 million. 
III. 
THE TAX COMMISSION DID NOT ACT IN AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
MANNER IN SETTING QUESTAR'S FAIR MARKET VALUE AT $296 MILLION. 
Questar argues that the Property Tax Division "has advanced 
inconsistent, ever-changing positions and theories" which this 
Court should somehow infuse into the final decision rendered by 
the Commission, and thereby view the Commission's decision as 
arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial 
evidence. The Tax Commission takes strong issue with this 
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argument and Questar's rationale. 
The authority to assess Questar's property is expressly 
vested in the Commission. Utah Const, art. XIII, § 11 mandates 
that the Commission "shall assess mines and public utilities. . . 
The Commission has properly delegated to the Property Tax 
Division the task of arriving at a figure representing 100% of 
fair market value of all Questar's property of as of January 1 of 
the taxable year. In arriving at a final figure, the Property 
Tax Division may employ several methods of valuation. In this 
case, it employed three approaches to valuation in an effort to 
arrive at one valuation and a fair and reasonable assessment. 
This represents a proper exercise of the Commission's 
administrative functions. 
A taxpayer has the opportunity to petition the Commission 
for a redetermination of an assessment it deems erroneous. In 
this case, during the formal hearing, Questar called expert 
witnesses that put forth arguments supportive of its position. 
It had full opportunity to question the Property Tax Division's 
witnesses and take issue with its position. The Commission, 
functioning properly in its adjudicative capacity, was fully 
apprised of all arguments and positions and supporting evidence 
for each position. Based upon this full appraisal, and after due 
consideration, the Commission made its final decision. It is the 
decisicn of the Commission, not the Property Tax Division that is 
subject to review by this Court. 
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Questar complains of a "moving target/' alleging unfairness 
because it could not determine the "weight" given to each of the 
three valuation methods in arriving at a final assessment. 
However, as previously argued, no "weighting" formula is 
required. The Commission's responsibility is to determine what 
is the reasonable and proper value of the property• In doing so, 
it may utilize and adopt one method of valuation, to the total 
exclusion of the other two, if that approach will render a proper 
result. See Utah Power & Light v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 322 
P.2d 590 (Utah 1979). Further, the Commission's past procedure 
does not mandate employment of a similar procedure in the future. 
Id. at 334. 
Questar and the Property Tax Division proposed three (3) 
approaches to value that resulted in three different valuation 
figures. It is the Commission's adjudicative responsibility to 
consider all pertinent arguments and evidence; but in the 
exercise of its expertise, it must determine the final valuation 
based on reasoned consideration of all the evidence. 
Questar claims the Commission acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner in setting the valuation at $296 million. For 
the reasons previously cited, this claim is without merit. The 
Commission properly considered all evidence and gave all due 
thought and consideration to Questar's arguments and experts' 
opinions. The findings are supported by substantial evidence and 
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support the final decision. The Commission's findings of fact 
are "accorded substantial deference and will not be overturned if 
based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from 
the evidence is permissible." Hurley v. Board of Review of 
Indus, Comm'n, 767 P.2d 524, 526-527 (Utah 1988). 
In Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v. Division of Health Care 
Fin., 797 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1990) the court of appeals provided 
a general overview of applicable standards of review of an 
administrative decision. The court stated that when reviewing an 
agency's findings of fact, courts traditionally accord 
considerable leeway to those findings and disturb them only if 
they are "arbitrary and capricious". Jji. at 433 (quoting USX v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883, 886 (Utah App. 1989)). Further, 
"findings are arbitrary and capricious when there is no evidence 
of any substance to support them." Ld. 797 P.2d 443. 
The Commission urges this Court to adopt a standard similar 
to that enunciated by Court of Appeals of Washington. Under this 
"arbitrary and capricious standard", a petitioner must show that 
the administrative agency's action was willful and unreasoning, 
and made without consideration and in disregard of facts and 
circumstances. Wallace v. Employment Sec. Dep't., 51 Wash.App. 
787, 755 P.2d 815, 819 (1988). See also Kerr-Belmark Const. Co. 
v. City Council, 36 Wash.App. 370, 674 P.2d 684, 687 (1984) where 
the court defined arbitrary and capricious as: 
[W]illful and unreasoning action, taken 
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without regard to a consideration of the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the 
action. Where there is room for two 
opinions, an action taken after due 
consideration is not arbitrary and capricious 
even though a reviewing court may believe it 
to be erroneous• 
The findings and conclusions of the Commission were based 
upon adequate evidence, Questar has not marshalled sufficient 
evidence to show that despite the supporting facts, the 
Commission's findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 
Therefore, the Commission's action cannot be characterized as 
arbitrary and capricious* 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons cited herein, the Commission respectfully 
urges this Court to affirm its finding that the fair market value 
of Questar Pipeline Company's operating property for 1988 was 
$296 million. 
DATED this +-*- day of June, 1991. 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
By Kelly w. Wright 
Assistant Attorney General 
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